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THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
CASE NOT TO BE COMIPELLED TO BE A
WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.*
MOSE E. BoIARsKY**

The early common law knew nothing of the maxim nemo
tenetur prodere seipsurn.' Its procedural methods had to
do with ex officio oath, with an interrogatory oath, and with
an inquisitorial procedure. Today, however, the accused
may sit "serenely watching the contest, wrapped in a mantle of presumption of innocence." 2
The procedure of investigation, or inquisitorial procedure,
seems to have originated in the Roman Law' and was
later adopted by the Catholic Church. Innocent III, whose
influence early in the 1200s, caused the abolition of the
trial by battle by the Church, introduced and developed the
interrogatory oath which pledged the accused to "swear
that you shall make true answers to all things that shall
be asked of you."4 One writer has said that the inquisitional cast to the oath probably had its origin in a combination of circumstances following the War of the Roses; that
the nobility had in large part been destroyed, thus removing a check upon the Crown.' Particularly was this true
when applied to criminals.
Much light has been thrown on the practice of questioning the accused of crime by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen.'
* The James F. Brown Prize Thesis, 1927-28. In 1919 the late James F.
Brown, of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested
by it and the income used as a prize for the best essay each year on the
subject of the individual liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitutions. Any senior or any graduate of any college of the University,
within one year after receiving his bachelor's degree, may compete for this
prize.
** LL. B., West Virginia University. Attorney at Law, Charleston, W. Va.
I "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself."
2 E. Ray Stevens, "Archaic Constitutional Provisions Protecting the Accused," JOURNAL OF AMERICAN INST. OF CRui. LAW AND CRIUNINOLOGY, V. 16.
3 MARICE PARMELEE, CRIMINOLOGY, 275.
4 For a complete history of the privilege against self-incrimination in all
its various phases, applicable both to the accused and to witnesses, see
WIoGBORE, EVIDENCE,

§2250.

r Albert J. Harno, "Recent Criminal Cases in Illinois," 6 ILL. LAW QUAR.

114.
6 STEPHEN, HiST. CBnit. LAw, 1., 325.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1928], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

Considering a group of trials which occurred between 1554
and 1637, he says:
"The prisoner, in nearly every instance asked, as a
favor that he might not be overpowered by the eloquence of a counsel denouncing him in a set speech, but,
in consideration of the weakness of his memory, might
be allowed to answer separately to the different matters which might be alleged against him. This was
usually granted, and the result was that the trial became a series of excited altercations between the
prisoner and the different counsel opposed to him.
Every statement of counsel operated as a question to
the prisoner, and indeed they were constantly thrown
into the form of questions, the prisoner either admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged
against him. The result was, that, during the period
in question, the examination of the prisoner * * * was
the very essence of the trial, and his answers regulated
the production of the evidence; * * *"
Under this method of procedure, the safeguards of innocence were disregarded, and frequently torture was used.
"The judge proceeds ex officio either of his own mere
motion, or on the suggestion of a promoter (inquisitio
cum promovente) ; * * *1,
"The accused was arrested, kept in confinement,
more or less close, and examined * * * the examination
being sometimes carried, on by means of torture. He
had no counsel, apparently no right to summon witnesses, and was not allowed to know the evidence
against him * * * The result was that he was or might
be given no opportunity to cross-examine them * * *"1
Certainly such a practice was void of prejudice against
self-incrimination and sentiment as to examining a defendant of his own defense. The Millenary Petition (1603),
asking for relief, contained, "That the oath ex-officio,
7 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. 2, 057, ot seq.;
also EsmEIN HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE CRIBEINELLE EN FRANCE, 284, 315.

8 Lowell, "The Judicial Use of Torture," 11 HAv. L. REV. 200, 204.
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whereby men are forced to accuse themselves, be more
sparingly used."'
The seventeenth century in English legal history gave to
us many of our existent institutions, and it is not strange,
therefore, that we should seek in that lperiod some light on
the development of a maxim which today has become wellrooted in our federal and state constitutions and one which
many courts are prone to apply liberally.
John Lilburn, an obstreperous and forward opponent of
the Stuarts and "popularly known as 'Freeborn John'" has
been accredited with having brought to a culmination the
use of the ex officio oath. The Star Chamber had charged
him with the printing or importing of heretical and seditious books. He denied these charges, and he refused to
make any answer to other like charges, saying:
"* * * If you will not ask me about the things laid
to my charge, I shall answer no more; * * * And of any
other matter that you have to accuse me of, I know it
is warrantable by the law of God, and I think by the
law of the land, that I may stand upon my just defense
and not answer to your interrogatories."
For this, he was condemned to be whipped, and the sentence was executed. Lilburn carried his complaint to
Parliament and "in 1648 the Lords ordered the sentence to
be totally vacated * * * as illegal and most unjust against
the liberty of the subject of law of the land and Magna
Carta.' ' I0 It is well to note, however, that nothing concerning the privilege is mentioned in the Magna Carta."
9

PRoHERO STATUTES AND CONsTI. Docs., 1558-1625, p. 415.
See SHAKESPEARE, HAmLET, Act III, Sc. 3, first published in 1603, wherein the King soliloquizes (as cited by Wigmore):
"In the corrupted currents of this world
Offence's gilded hiand may shove by justice;
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law. But 'tis not so above;
There is no shuffling; there the action lies
In his true nature, and, we ourselves compelled,
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults,
to give in evidence."
10 See WiGmoE, supra, n. 4.
il "Compulsory self-incrimination existed for four hundred years after
Magna Carta * * " THOMAS JAMES NoaTiN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrrED STATES,

p. 213.
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Meanwhile, Parliament had passed a statute in which
was inserted a clause which forever forbade any ecclesiastica.1 court to administer eo officio any oath requiring answer
as to matters penal 2 and this clause was substantially reenacted after the restoration of the Stuarts. 8
What has been said applied to the ecclesiastical courts.
It was totally lacking, at least until 1600, in the common
law courts. In 1533, a statute 4 provided that:
"Every person presented or indicted of any heresy,
or duly accused by two lawful witnesses may be * * *
committed to15 the ordinary (of the church) to answer in
open court."

In 1590, Udall appeared before a common law jury with
witnesses charging him with seditious libel, and he pleaded
not guilty. He did not, however, claim any privilege
against self-accusation, though but a few months before, he
had claimed the privilege before the High Commission
Court."6
In the Jesuit Garnet's trial for the Gunpowder Plot, the
accused, before the Council, said:
"When one is asked a question before a magistrate,
he is not bound to answer before some witnesses be
produced against him, 'qwida nemo tentur prodere 8eipsump 1"
He made no such plea before the common law judges."'
12 No person "exercising * * * ecclesiastical power * * * shall 'e
officio'
or at the instance or promotion of any whatsoever, urge, enforce, tender,

give or minister" to any person "any corporal oath whereby he or they
shall or may be charged * * * to make any presentment of any crime or
offense * * * or to accuse himself or herself of any crime * * * or by reason
whereof he or she shall or may be liable or exposed to any * *
punish-

ment whatsoever." STAT. 16. I, 4 (1641).
'3 STAT. 13 Car. II. 12 (1661).

ST. 25 HMNRY VIII, Oh. 14.
15 R. v. Derby, 18 How. St. Tr. 1011, 1013.
'6 1 How. St. Tr. 1271, 1274.
17 Coke cites two cases contra to Garnet's case, 12 Rep. 27; 3 Bulstr. 49.
Wigmore says that "neither of these indicate the existence of any common
law rule * * *. The only source of doubt that can be found arises from
certain scantily reported chancery rulings of the late 1500s," citing, among
others, Cromer v. Penston, Cary 13 (1587); Wolgrave v. Coe, Troth. 18,
'4

(1595).
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But in 1660, it was definitely given judicial recognition in
Scroop's Trial 8 where the court says to the accused:
"Did you sit upon the sentence day, that is the evidence, which was the 27th day of January? You are
not bound to answer me, but if you will not we must
prove it. Do you confess that?"'"
Lilburn had never claimed the right to refuse absolutely
to answer a criminating question: he had merely claimed a
proper proceeding of accusation or presentment ;2o but, once
the em officio oath was abrogated, the maxim nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum was prominently urged. Accordingly the
practice of questioning the accused died out soon after the
Revolution of 1688.21 However, committing magistrates
were authorized to take the examination of persons suspected, which if not under oath, was admissible against him
on his trial, until, by statute,2" the prisoner had the option
to speak if he desired and he was warned that what he said
might be used against him. 3 The change in the English
criminal procedure in this particular seems to be founded
upon no particular statute and no judicial decision, but
upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts to a
popular demand. One writer finds a casual connection
between the privilege and the period in English history
which deposed a tyrannical king and "changed the succession to the crown; which restored to the British Constitution its democratic element, at the same time defining
and enlarging it; which curbed the royal prerogative
and emancipated the judiciary from that slavish subserviency to the crown which had disgraced it under the
Stuarts, * * *11"' The change effected was but a natural
sequence of the change from tyranny to liberty, from a
cruel and truckling judiciary to a judiciary made independent, that it might stand indifferent between the
is 5 How. St. Tr. 947.
20 Cited and quoted in Note 5, 6 ILL. Iow QuAR. 76. The privilege was
extended, by 1685, to include an ordinary witness, and not merely the party
charged. See Reading's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 259, 296.
20 WIGoREo,
cit. supra, n. 4.
21 STEPHEN, I, 358.

22 11 and 12 VimT., Oh. 2.
23 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 102 (1908).
24 WM. A. MAuOy, n. 165.
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crown and the prisoner. The principle became a popular
one principally because it was opposed to the use of torture then prevailing on the continent and Scotland.2
It is
interesting to note that the privilege is totally lacking in
the English Bill of Rights (1688).
While this English doctrine was developing, the precisely
contemporary struggle across the Channel is in marked
contrast with its opposite results. The Council of Louis
XVI, in drafting the great Criminal Ordonnance of 1670,
fixed, for a century to come, the French rule of compulsory
self-crimination 2
During this same period, the rule was
evidently unknown in America. It remained an unknown
doctrine during a whole generation in the Colony of Massachusetts," where, as late as 1685, the interrogatory oath
was permitted.2
Despite the fact that their English forefathers had not
registered the privilege against self-accusation among the
fundamentals of jury procedure, the American constitution
makers of 1789, "who had themselves suffered nothing * * *
and could aim merely to copy the lessons which our forefathers of a century ago had handed down from their own
experiences," incorporated the principle.2 " This, however,
was not the first declaration of the privilege in the col25 For an excellent account of a French
25 WIGMOE, cit. supra, n. 4, n. 107.
27 RAnT, AMEnICAN HISTORY TOLD BY

trial, see 5 AMER. L. REV. 38.

CONTEMPORARIES, Vol. 1, p. 382:
The Trial of a Woman Antinomian. See also, C. F. ADAMS, THREE EPISODES
OF MASSACHUSETTS HISrORY, I, 363-509.
28 BRADFORD'S HISTORY OF A PLYMOUTH PLANTATIOn, 465 (1042):
Answers by a minister to a letter of inquiry from the Governor of Boston:
"'Quest. How farr a majestrate may extracte a confession from a delinquente to accuse himselve of a capitall crime, seeing 'nemo tenetur
prodre seipsum?' 'Ans. A majestrate cannot without sin neglecte deligente inquision into the cause brought before him. If it be manifesto that
a capitall crime is committed, and that common report, or probabilitie,
suspition or some complainte (or the life) be of this or that person, a
majestrate ought to require and by all due means to procure from the
person (so farr allready betrayed) a naked confession of the fact * * *;
for though 'nemo tenetur prodere seipsum,' yet by that which may be
known to the majestrate by the forenamed means, he is bound thus to die;
or else he may betray his countrie and people to the heavie displeasure
of God.'"
29 WiOmoRE, oit. supra. n. 4 n. 112.
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onies. ° Virginia, in its first constitution, adopted at Williamsburg, in 1776, provided that a person accused of
crime entitled to certain rights and privileges for his protection among them, that he could not be "compelled to
give evidence against himself"."' Massachusetts's first constitution, adopted in 1780, provided that no person held to
answer "for any crime or offence" could be "compelled to
accuse or furnish evidence against himself."3 2 In the first
constitution of Maryland, adopted on November 11, 1776,
it was provided that "no man ought to be compelled to give
evidence against himself in a common court of law, or any
other court". 3 Similar provisions were made in the first
constitutions of New Hampshire, " ' Pennsylvania, "5 and North
Carolina." This illustrates the great importance that was
attached to this privilege by the inhabitants of the colonies when the original states first attempted to set up their
own form of government, so that the doctrine became a
part of the fundamental law, and in the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, it was provided
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."'
Since that time, the language of the Fifth Amendment is repeated without substantial change in the constitution of every state admitted
so John D. Carroll, "The Extent* of the Cross-Examination to Which an
Accused May be Subjected When He Offers Himself as a Witness in His
Own Behalf," 11 VA. L. REv. 248 (1925).
31 VA. CONST. §8 (1776).
32 MAss. CONST. §12 (1780).
23 AI. CONST. §20 (1776).
34 N. H. CONST. §15 (1785).
35 PA.CONST. §9 (1776).
30 N. C. CONST. §7 (1776).
37 CONSTITUTION or Urr
STATES, Fifth Amend.
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into the Union," excepting New Jersey39 and Iowa;"° but
the courts of those states have held that the immunity from
self-incrimination is a part of the fundamental law. Explanation of the Colonial Conventions' insistence for the
privilege differs. One writer says "it would seem to be
found in the agitation then going on in France against the
inquisitional feature of the Ordonnance of 1670."" Another writer gives as the reason the inquisitional method."
These constitutional provisions are not considered as creating a new privilege or enlarging the one existing at common law. They are, in reality, declaratory of the common
law rule.
How far then shall we apply the privilege? Shall we
38 Ala. 1, 10; Ariz. II, §7; Ark. II, §8; Cal. I, §13, 0. C. S. 1872 P.
2065, P. C. S. 688, 1323; Col. II, p. 18; Conn. Art. 1, §9, Gen. St. 1918, p.
5522; Del. I, §7; Fla. Deel. of P, §12, Rev. G. S. 1919, P. 6080; Ga. I §1,
par. 6, Rev. C. 1910, §4544, 5877, 6363, §4554, P. C. 1910, §9, 1037, par. 3,
Haw, Rev. L. 1915, §2613 (quoted ante, §488); Ida. I, §13, Comp. St. 1919,
§8623, §8044 (like Cal. C. C. P., §2065); 11. II, §10; Ind. I, §14; Han.
Bill of R., §7; Ky. §11; La. 1, §11, St. 1916, No. 157, (quoted ante, §488)
C. Pr. 1870, §136; Me. I, §6, Rev. St. 1916, c. 87, §113, c. 136, §19;
Md. Deel. of IL, 22; Mass. Deel. of R., 12; Mich. II, §16, Comp. L. 1915,
§12547; Minn. I, §7; Miss. 11I, §26, Code 1906, §1923, Hem. §1583; Mo.
II, §23, Rev. St. 1919, §5412; Mont. III, §18, Rev. C. 1921, §10673, (like
Cal. C. C. P. S. 2065) P. C. S. 11613, §12177, §1393; Nebr. I, §12, Rev.
St. 1921, §8844; Nev. I, §8, Rev. L. 1912, §6857, (like Const. Art. I, §8)
§5437, (like Cal. C. 0. P. S. 2065); N. H. I, 15; N. Mfex. 11, §15, Annot.
St. 1915, §2170; N. Y. I, §6, C. Cr. P. 1881, §10, Rev. St., I, 94, §13, C. P.
A. 1920, §355; N. C. I, §11, Con. St. 1919, §1799; N. Dak. I, §13, Comp.
L. 1913, §10395; Ohio, Const. 1851, I, §10, as amended 1912; Okl. II, §21,
§27 (immunity; quoted post, §2281) Comp. St. 1921, §2351; Or. I, §12,
Laws 1920, §870; Pa. I, §9, Pub. L. 1887, p. 158, §10, P. I. U. S. St. 1902,
July; Philippines Act. §5, St. 1916, Aug. 29, c. 416, §3, 39 Stats. 546,
Code 1919, §4112; P. R. Fed. 381 (the Fifth Amendment held effective in
Porto Rico, "because it is a principle of natural justice woven into the
web and woof of our form of government"; a sounder reason is that the
rule is a part of the common law in Federal courts) ; R. 1. I, §13; S. C. 1,
§17, C. C. Pr. 1922, §967; S. Dak. VI, §9, Rev. 0. 1919, §4412; -Tenn. I,
§9; Tex. I, §10, Rev. C. Cr. P. 1911, §4; Utah, 1, §12, Comp. L. 1917, S.
S. 7141, 8555; Vt. Ch. I, Art. 3, Gen. L. 1917, §1900, §3541; Va. I, §8;
Wash. I, §9; W. Va. III, §5; Wis. I, §8, Stats. 1919, §4077; Wyo.
I, §11, Comp. St. 1920, §7507.
39 N. J. Comp. St. 1910, Evidence, §8, §2 quoted ante, §488, 1903,
State v. Zdanowiez, 69 N. J. L. 620, 55 At. 743 (1905), ("Although we
have not deemed it necessary to insert in our Constitution this prohibitive
provision, the Common-law doctrine, unaltered by legislation or by lax
practice, is by us deemed to have its full force.") State V. Miller, 71 N. J.
L,. 527, 60 Atl. 202 (State v. Zdanowicz, approved). 1916, Canover V. West
Jersey Mortgage Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 16, 99 Atl. 604 (Receiver).
40 IOWA CONST. I, 10.
41 WIGMOBE, supra, n. 4, n. 112.
42 JOHN fD. CARRoLL, supra, n. 30.
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extend it to all criminating possibilities? It is well settled,
for instance, that the privilege does not apply to protect
one against pecuniary loss43 and that it applies only to
criminal liability or the equivalent thereto.
It is generally stated that the privilege against selfaccusation exists, not only when the accused is liable criminally to prosecution, but extends also to cases where his
answer would tend to expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture." This raises the questions, what is a penalty and
what is a forfeiture? For the purposes of this discussion,
a penalty is a liability to pay money" or yield up a public
privilege." Such a penalty is not necessarily a criminal
liability as distinguished from a civil liability, for when a
penalty lies in the payment of money, a mere unregulated
increase in compensation under the name of exemplary
damages is really a civil liability.47 In Lees v. United
States,4 where an action, civil in form, was brought to recover a penalty for importing an alien under a contract to
perform labor, in violation of a Congressional enactment,
it was held that, while the action was civil in form, it was
undoubtedly criminal in its nature, and the defendant could
not be compelled to be a witness against himself. 9 However, in the case of Levy v. Superior Court.," it was held
that the privilege is not applicable to penalties of a purely
remedial character.
The distinction between a penalty and a forfeiture is a
shadowy one. The latter, however, is really a criminal
liability." "When a right of property is devised, or a liability to pay money to another person is created, by way
of a retribution for misconduct done, or of a deterrent from
misconduct apprehended, the effect is in spirit penal; and
the disclosure52 of such facts should therefore be protected
by privilege.1
Bull v. Loveland, 9 Pick. (Mass.) (1830).
44 29 R. C. L. 425; Note, 75 Amer. St. Rep. 322.
45 U. S. v. Mathews, 23 Fed. 74, 75 (1885).
46 Featherstone v. People, 194 Ill.
325, 62 N'. E. 684, 687 (1901).
47 WIa~onom, §2257.
48 150 U. S. 476 (1893).
40 See accord. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1885).
50 105 Cal. 600, 39 Pac. 965 (1895).
i1 Castro v. U. S., 23 F. (2d) 263 (1928).
52 WIGMOE, §2256.
43
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The privilege against self-incrimination has sometimes
been confused with the privilege to refuse answers which
tend merely to disgrace witnesses."
The early trend of
judicial authority, especially in England, was to allow a refusal of an answer that tended to degrade one's moral reputation. The two privileges were never confused in England. The privileges against disgracing answers clearly
existed there in the early part of the 18th century," before
the limits of the other privilege were clearly fixed. The
rulings on the privilege were conflicting."
The privilege
has two limitations: (1) It applied only to collateral facts"0
-facts affecting character, bias, corruption; (2) it applied
only to facts directly involving disgrace and not to facts
merely tending to disgrace indirectly. This was brought
7
out pointedly in the case of People v. Mather."
However,
58
in United States v. James Grosscup, J., said:
"The privilege which the framers of the amendment
secured was silence against the accusation of the federal government. Did they take no thought of the
pains of practical outlawry? * * * If the immunity was
only against the law-inflicted pains and penalties, the
government could probe the secrets of every conversation, or society, by extending compulsory pardon to
one of its participants, and thus turn him into an involuntary informer. Exposure, self-confessed exposure,
would lose him his place in society, his good name in
the world, and like a bill of attainder, taint his blood
and that of all who inherit it."
This same view was expressed in the dissenting opinion"
5r Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 648 (1854):
"Such an examination * * * is inquisitorial, and tends to compel her to criminate and disgrace herself * * "
54 Cook's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 334 (1696).
55 In Rex ,. Lewis, 4 Esp. 225 (1803), the question asked was whether
he had not been in the House of Correction, and Lord Ellenborough held
this to be privileged. See contra Cundell v. Pratt, Moo. & M. 108.
56 State v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 296, 43 S. E, 160 (1902).
57 4 Wend. (Mass. 230, 21 Amer. Dec. 122 (1830).
58 60 Fed. Rep. 257 (1894).
59 By Field, J.
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in Brown v. Walker.!'

But the majority view was ex-

pressed thus:
"The fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the
witness in public estimation does not exempt him from
the duty of disclosure. A person who commits a
criminal act is bound to contemplate the consequence
of exposure to his good name and reputation, and ought
not to call upon the courts to protect that which he has
himself esteemed to be .of such little value. * * * The
design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the
witness in vindicating his character. * * *"

Other cases clearly show that the infamy or disgrace
which may result from disclosures made by a defendant are
not matters which the constitution shields;1 but if the answer has no effect upon the case except to impair his credibility, it has been held that the constitutional privilege
might be invoked. 2
In some of the states, a prisoner, charged with a crime
and brought before an examining magistrate, may, after witnesses in support of the charge have been heard, make a
statement concerning the charge. This may be used against
him on trial if it has a tendency to establish his guilt, provided the accused has first been cautioned that he need
not answer and if he does, whatever he says is entirely
voluntary." This was first brought about by statute in
England" and the provisions thereof have been adopted in
several of the states." Wigmore points out that "the
rule excluding untrustworthy confessions and the rule
giving a privilege against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination are sometimes not kept plainly apart * * *

for not only have they the common feature of an acknowledgment of guilty facts, but also, by the test frequently employed, the test of voluntariness for confessions becomes al60 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594 (1896).
0' Hill v. State, 4 Ind. 112. (1853);
Clementine v. State, 14 Mo. 112
(1851) ; STABRKIE, EVID. I, 193; Leach v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 497, 112
S. E. 595 (1908); State v. Angel, 93 S. C. 149, 76 S. E. 190 (1912); but
see It re Klinzer's Will, 130 N. Y. S. 1059, 71 Mliss. Rep. 620 (1911).
02 Ew parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737, 13 Ann. Cas. 1173 (1907).
03 COOLEY'S CONST. LITATmOS, 8th ed., 651.
04 1 and 2 Phil. and M., c. 13.

or

GREENLErA,

EvD., 15th ed., §224.
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most identical with the idea of compulsion as forbidden by
the privilege. * * * If the privilege, fully established by
1680, has sufficed for both classes of cases, there would
have been no need in 1780 for creating the distinct rule
about confessions." 6 As expressed by one jurist:
"I hold it to be clear that when the law rejects a disclosure made under oath by a person charged with a
crime, it does so, not because any right or privilege of
the prisoner has been violated but because it is deemed
unsafe to rely upon it as evidence of guilt. * **1,,
Courts, however, have given judicial expressions which
blend the two into one principle. For example the Colorado
court"8 held that "a constitutional provision that no person
shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal
case applies not alone to confessions of guilt, (made bbfore
a coroner's jury)" but to any admission which may furnish
a single link in a chain of evidence by which his conviction
of a criminal offense may be secured." Courts have said
that to make a confession admissible, it must be shown that
it is voluntary.7
But what is voluntary has given courts
some trouble. Selden, J., in a dissenting opinion7 1 said:
"The criterion given in most of the cases by which to
determine whether a declaration or confession of a person charged with a crime is competent evidence against
him upon his trial, is, to ascertain whether it was voluntarily made. * * * Now it is obvious that this is not
a strictly accurate test. * * * A confession * * * made
upon the heel of promises of favor, may be perfectly
voluntary, yet it is rejected. * * * If by voluntary is
meant uninfluenced by the disturbing fear of punishment, or by flattering hopes of favor, the expression
may be accurate."
This same expression was later given in a majority opinion
of the New York Court.7 2
66 See WIGMO E, §2266 for a discussion of the differences between the
rule on confessions and the privilege as applied to all witnesses.
O6 Selden, J., see n. 71.
68 Tuttle v. The People, 33 Colo. 243, 70 L. R. A. 33 (1905).
69 Insertions are those of the writer.
70 GREENLEAP, EvD., 15th ed., §219.
71 Hendrickson v. The People, 10 N. Y. 13 (1854).
72 People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384 (1857); see also Eyre, C. B., in
Warickshall's Case, 1 Leach Cr. Cas. 209.
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The prisoner is not to be sworn, for, as it has been said
where the accused takes an oath "any confession he may
make is deprived of its voluntary character,73 though there
is a contrariety of opinion on this point."74 While "it may,
at first view, appear unreasonable to refuse evidence of a
confession, merely because it was made under oath, thus
having in favor of its truth, one of the highest sanctions
known in the law," as one writer expressed : "it is to be
observed that none but voluntary confessions are admissible; and that if to the perplexities and embarrassments of
the prisoner's situation are added the danger of perjury
* * * the confession can scarcely be regarded as voluntary;
but on the contrary, it seems to be made under the very
influences, which the law is solicitous to avoid." Decisions
put it thus: "The reason is that in the agitation of mind
in which the party charged is supposed to be, he is liable
to be influenced by the hope of advantage, or fear of injury
to state things which are not true."'
Generally, in all cases, except treason," the confession of
the accused may be received in evidence to establish his
guilt; but the confession is said not to be sufficient evidence of the crime, and should only be allowed for the purWhile
pose of connecting the defendant with the offense."
a, confession is not admissible if the accused's hopes or fears
are operated upon to induce him to make it, statements
made before the confession which were likely to do away
with the effect of the inducements have been admitted in
evidence." In Comvonwealth v. Curtis,"° the prisoner had
asked the officer who made the arrest, whether he had better
plead guilty, and the officer replied that "as a general
thing, it was better for a man who was guilty to plead
guilty, for he got a lighter sentence." After that he made
statements which were relied upon to prove his guilt. The
73 Wilson v. U. S. 162, U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 109D, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895
(1895) ; Com. v. Clark, 130 Pa. St. 641, 18 Atl. 988, (1889).
74 State v. Gilman, 51 Me. 215 (1863).
7r GREENLEAF, supra, §225.
76 People v. McMahon, supra, n. 72.
77 FED. CONST., Art. III, 3.
78 Stringfellow -v. State, 26 Miss. 157 (1853).

70 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 724 (1870); State v. Welch,
36 W. Va. 690, 15 S. E. 419 (1892).
so 97 Mlass. 574 (1867).
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court held the confession inadmissible, "although the 'officer's remarks related to pleading guilty on trial and not
to making a confession ii pa'is, and although the prisoner
began the conversation and solicited the advice of the officer, who first told him that 'lie did not wish to advise him
one way or another.'" But, "saying to the prisoner that
it will be the worse for him if lie does not confess, or that it
will be better for him if lie does, is sufficient to exclude the
confession."'" A voluntary confession obtained by artifice
is admissible8 and a confession has been admitted where
there is a mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the
truth. 8 Properly, a confession made by a defendant on a
legal examination should be given in evidence against him
unless made by him under the influence of a threat or a
promise, or other coercion calculated to produce an untrue
confession. Each case, however, should, 84and does, depend
largely on its own special circumstances.
While the privilege protects the accused from testimonial
compulsions, courts have not limited the applicability thereof to oral testimony."' Documents and chattels have been
held to be within the privileges, "though the accused should
The immunity
hold it (them) in his hands in the court.""
has been held to be violated even where there is no more
than a demand on a defendant in a criminal case, in the
presence of a jury, to produce a paper referred to, which
contains incriminating evidence against him ;s"but merely
asking the accused whether lie had the original of an incriminating document has been held not to be an infringement upon the privilege against self-accusation. 8 The
privilege applies only to private papers, and not to public
or official documents which are kept as a public trust and
which are subject to permissible inspection by the public
81 2 Hale, C. P. 659.
S2

State -v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257 (1887).

83 Ann. Cas. 1913 B 302.
S4 Tuttle v. People, supra, n. 68.
85 WIGMORE, §2263 quotes Earl, J., in People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119,
38 N. E. 1003 (1894): "The main purpose of the privilege was to pro.
hibit the compulsory examination of prisoners * * * for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in crime.
s8 Roe v. Hervey, 4 Burr. 2484, 2489.
87 Gillispie v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 546, 115 Pac. 620 (1911); COOLEY, CONSTITUTiONAL LIMITATIONS, I, 650.
88 State v. Morden, 87 Wash. 465, 151 Pac. 832 (1915).
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at any time."5 Where the legislature, acting within the
police power, requires a record of one engaged in the pursuit of a particular vocation, as for example, a druggist,"
the records are in no sense private papers, and no constitutional privilege is violated by requiring their production; °" but in such cases, there must be a provision in the
enactment making them public documents. 2
What the first Congress thought of the idea of compelling
a man to produce evidence against himself may be inferred
from a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 :9
"All of the said courts of the United States shall
have power in the trial of actions at law, on motion
and due notice thereof being given, to require the
parties to produce books or writings in their possession
or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue,
in cases and under circumstances where they might be
compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of
chancery*
And so, the United States Supreme Court in the Boyd
Case 4 said that "any compulsory discovery * * * compelling
the production of his private books and papers, to convict
him of a crime * * * is contrary to the principles of a free
government *
* it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom." 95
This same case, by way of obiter, declared the "privilege
applicable to documents obtained by officers' search or
seizure, legal or illegal, irrespective of testimonial pros9State v. Donovan, 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709 (1901) ; but see TAYLOR,
LA w OF EviDnmCE, §1351: !'* * * neither the * * * Queen's Bench nor the
court of chancery will ever oblige a person to allow the inspection of either
public or private documents in his custody, where the inspection is sought
for the purpose of supporting a prosecution against himself." See also,
Mass. Pub. Stat. (Rev. L.) 1902, C. 3, §17.
90 State v. Smith, 74 Iowa 580, 38 N. W. 492 (1888).
91 State v. Pence, 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488 (1909).
92 Ibid; also n. 25 L. IR. A. N. S. 818.
93 Quoted from Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746 (1885).
94 POLLOCK, PRODUCTION OF DocumENTS, 27.

Or Boyd v. U. S., supra, n. 93, holding that an Act of Congress which
authorizes a court of the United States in revenue cases, on motion of the
government attorney, to require the defendant to produce in court his private papers, books, and invoices, was unconstitutional, as being repugnant
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
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cess. 99 Previous holdings 7 had admitted documents and
chattels obtained from the accused's possession without use
of process. 8 Since the Boyd Case, state courts have divided
on the question. In the case of Gindrat v. People,"
the court refused the pronouncement of the United States
Supreme Court. But the two cases may be distinguished.
In the Boyd Case, the erroneous order compelled the accused to produce evidence against himself, while in the
Gindrat Case, the question of illegality was raised collaterally, and the court simply admitted evidence which
was offered-not by the accused-and did not inquire
whether possession of it had been obtained lawfully or unlawfully.
In the case of State v. Griswoly,'" the use of an envelope
containing pictures, as evidence against a person accused
of crime, was held not a violation of a constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination, even though the envelope
and enclosures were taken from his premises by a trespasser. This case has been distinguished from the Boyd
Case upon the ground that in the Griswold -Case "the thing
used in evidence was a simple piece of personal property,
having of its own no voice or meaning so far as guilt or innocence was concerned, and giving no evidence, the evidence
in the case arising from the conduct of the defendant with
reference to it."''
Other courts' 2 have followed the Boyd
Case and exclude the evidence.
But, in a later case,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the fact that papers, pertinent to the issue, may
have been illegally taken from the possession of the party
against whom they are offered is not a valid objection to
their admissibility. In the Weeks Case'" the same court
reached a contrary result. "The Federal courts cannot, as
against a seasonable application for their return, in a crimi90 WIGMORE, §2263.
97 Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Mete. 329.
98 Francia's Trial, 15 How. St. Tr. 897, 966 (1717).

99 138 Il1. 103, 27 N. E. 1085 (1891).
100 67 Conn. 290, 34 At. 1046 (1896).
1o1 Note, 59 L. R. A. 465, 469 (1903).
202 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 659, 91 N. W. 935 (1902); Blum V. State,
94 Md. 375, 51 Ati. 26 (1902); People v. Spiegel, 143 N. Y. 107, 38 N. E.
284 (1894).
os Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904).
104 Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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nal case, retain for the purposes of evidence against the accused his letters and correspondence seized in his house in
his absence and without his authority by a United States
Marshal holding no warrant for his arrest or for the seizure
of his premises." In this case, the court distinguished the
Adams Case, stating that the decision in the earlier cases
rested upon incidental seizure made in the execution of a
legal warrant.
What may be said for the doctrine expressed in the
Weeks Case? "The arguments in favor of this new doctrine
are, that the officer making such search is an agent of the
state and to permit the use of evidence taken by him without authority is to validate an unreasonable search and
seizure; and that such use is compelling the accused to testify against himself."' On the other hand it is said to look
behind the evidence raises the trial of outside issues and
that the exclusion of such evidence is an indirect penalty on
the law enforcers."1 0 6
To the contention that instruments, devices, or tokens
used in the commission of a crime and illegally seized should
not be used in evidence, the West Virginia court'" said:
"One complete answer to this is that, if it was an illegal seizure, that is no objection to the use of the papers as evidence * * * for the court can take no notice
how they were obtained * * "
The court distinguishes the Edwards Case from the Boyd
Case on the ground that in the latter case the seizure was of
private papers belonging to the defendant. Yet the same
0 8 permitted
court later"
a letter, written by the accused to
his mother and intercepted by the jail keeper, to be introduced in evidence.109
May a corporation refuse to produce its books on the
ground that it may, by the production thereof, incriminate
itself? It has been held that a corporation is not a "per1o5 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v'. U. S., 251 U. S. 385 (1920); State V.
Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
100

30 W. VA. LAw QUAn. 203.

107 Poffenbarger, J., in State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429

(1902).

108 State v. Booker, 68 W. Va. 8, 09 S.E. 295 (1910).
1oo See State v'. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811, 43 L. R. A. X. S.

399 (1912); U. S. v. Snyder, 278 F. 650 (D. C. W. Va. 1922).
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son" within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution, because the privilege does not apply to
non-personal entities; 1O and, therefore, a corporation cannot
resist, upon the ground of the constitutional protection
against self-crimination, the compulsory production of its
books and papers before the grand jury under a subpoena
duces tecem."' Neither may a corporation officer refuse to
produce the records in his possession because their contents
may tend to incriminate him,'12 because ordinarily the officer does not hold such documents in his private capacity.
In a work of authority it is stated: "It would seem reasonable, however, that when books or papers are only nominally the work and property of the corporation and are essentially the product and private act of an individual, to
hold that he may refuse to produce them when they would
have a tendency to incriminate him, if they are in his custody. In such a case they are as much his private papers
as if they had no connection whatever with corporation
business."'
Since the purpose of the privilege is protection, if the evidence sought to be elicited could in no event tend to a conviction of an offense, his privilege to remain silent does not
attach. This is true, if at the time the testimony is given,
the acts are no longer punishable by virtue of the repeal of
the statute creating the offense, or by reason of conviction
and satisfaction of the sentence," 4 or the barrier to punishment raised by lapse of time." 5
Frequently statutes have been enacted compelling a party
to appear and to give testimony, and indemnifying such
party against future penal conviction. The question arises,
why does this not do away with the constitutional privilege?
An early New York case". held that a statute which
compelled the giving of testimony, but which provided that
11o In rec Bornn Hat Co., 223 U. S. 713, 56 L. ed. 626, 32 S. Ct. 521
(1912).
M11Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538 (1911); Commonwealth v.
Southern Express Co., 169 S. W. 517, 160 Ky. 1 (1914).
112 Dreier v. U. S., 221 U. S. 394, 55 L. ed. 784 (1911).
,is 28 R. C. L. 439, citing Notes, 30 L. R. A. N. S. 726, and Ann. Cas.
1912 D 569.
11 Ex parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 38 Pac. 364 (1894).
115 Ibid.
116 People v. Kelley, 24 N. Y. 74 (1861).
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the testimony so given should not be used in any prosecution or proceeding, civil or criminal, against the one giving
such testimony, was sufficient protection. This, however,
was overruled in a later case."' The United States Supreme
Court has held that nothing short of absolute immunity
from prosecution could satisfy the constitutional guaranty,
and that a statute declaring that no evidence obtained from
a witness should be given in evidence, or in any manner
used, against him or his property, in any criminal proceeding, did not supply a complete immunity because it
did not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony to be used against him."' A later United States
court decision" 9 compelled testimony to be given, even
tbough it brought one's former acts within the definition of
crime, and the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird 20 declared that the immunity extended by the interstate commerce act, from prosecution or from forfeiture of
estate because testimony given in pursuance of the requirements of the law, satisfies the Fifth Amendment.
(Continued in neot issue.)
117 People ex, rel Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253, 68 N. E. 353 (1903).

118 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110 (1892) ; Cullen
v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. 624 (1873).
See W. VA. CODE Oh. 152, §18.
It is doubtful if the W. Va. statute provides an immunity which is coextensive with the privilege.
119 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819 (1891).
120 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860 (1903).
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